Coming up with a radical business model that breaks the rules of the game in an industry is easy! The difficult part is to implement such radical strategies in the marketplace so as to deliver real value to customers in a cost-efficient and profitable way. We argue that Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is a key enabler to the successful implementation of radical new strategies. Specifically, we show that ICT enables firms to: (i) reach consumers that nobody else can serve profitably; (ii) offer radically new value propositions to consumers that other firms cannot deliver in a cost-efficient way; and (iii) put in place value chains that no other firm could do efficiently. ICT also allows strategic innovators to scale up their business models quickly and so protect themselves from competitive attacks.
Merrill Lynch, British Airways and IBM compete 1 . Making an assessment whether a new strategy is really different from an established one is, obviously, a very subjective exercise. Nevertheless, past research has demonstrated that it is possible to measure the extent to which two strategies are different and that strategic innovation is a common phenomenon, especially in mature industries (Markides and Charitou, 2004; Slywotzky, 1996) .
Previous research has found that strategic innovation is a particularly effective strategy for small firms or new entrants in an industry (Geroski and Toker, 1993; Markides, 1997; Utterback, 1994) . Because these firms have to compete against entrenched established competitors that enjoy first-mover advantages, they cannot simply attack head-on, hoping to "outcompete" their bigger rivals. They must employ "guerrilla tactics" to avoid head-tohead competition.
Not surprisingly, the more innovative the strategy that an attacker adopts, the higher the probability that the attack will succeed. For example, it has been demonstrated that successful strategic innovators were those firms that invaded existing markets either by introducing products or services that emphasized radically different value propositions to those emphasized by established competitors or by adopting radically different value chain configurations to those prevailing in the industry (Bower and Christensen, 1995; Porter, 1985) .
We do not doubt that to be successful, strategic innovators must adopt an innovative and well-differentiated strategy. Without an innovative strategy, it is unlikely that they can be effective against bigger and stronger rivals 2 . But this factor cannot be the sole reason for their success: for every company that strategically innovated and succeeded there are many others that innovated in a similar way but failed. Consider, for example, the case of Osborne Computers. Very much like the founders of Apple Computers, Adam Osborne founded the Osborne Computer Corp in 1981 to sell a portable personal computer. In doing so, he overturned the prevailing business model in the computer industry and went after a totally different customer from the established competitors. In his own words: "I 1 To qualify as strategic innovation, the new strategy must be new not only to the company that introduces it but to the industry as a whole (Hamel, 2000) . 2 In fact, it has been shown that without the benefit of a new technological innovation, it is extremely difficult for any firm to successfully attack the established industry leaders or to successfully enter a new market where established players exist. For example, it has been estimated that the probability that the No. 1 ranked firm in a particular industry will survive as No. 1 is about 96%--an almost certainty. For the second ranked firm, the probability of survival is 91% and for the third ranked firm it is 80% (Davies, Geroski, Lund and Vlassopoulos, 1991; Geroski and Toker, 1993) . saw a truck-size hole in the industry, and I plugged it i. " This brought the company enormous success-sales grew to $100 million within 18 months. But only two years later, in 1983, the company went bankrupt.
The case of Webvan is a more recent and prominent example. When it opened for business in June 1999 in the San Francisco Bay area, its founder and CEO Louis H.
Borders proclaimed that: "Webvan fundamentally transforms and simplifies the way customers shop for their groceries." Armed with $122 million in initial funding and a unique and radical business model, Webvan set about to revolutionize the low-margin and intensely competitive grocery business. There is no question that the business model was radical and innovative-yet, Webvan turned out to be one of the Internet's most spectacular failures.
Similar stories of companies that strategically innovated but failed abound. Readers familiar with the rise and fall of the airline company People Express will no doubt see the similarities between its (failed) strategy and the (successful) strategy of Southwest Airlines in the USA or easyJet in the UK. Similarly, despite following equally radical strategies, the retail chain Next in the UK failed miserably whereas the Body Shop enjoyed considerable success.
These examples highlight the central thesis of our article: coming up with a radical strategy that breaks the rules of the game in an industry is easy! The difficult part is to actually implement the new strategy in an economical and effective manner so that real value is delivered to customers in a cost-efficient way. This is what usually separates success from failure.
How then could potential strategic innovators implement their radical strategies successfully? To explore this question, we embarked on a two-year research project to study strategic innovation in more detail. The focus of our research was to examine in depth a number of strategic innovators from a variety of industries and try to understand the reasons behind their success. In the process, we studied and wrote case studies on twenty companies that we had identified as strategic innovators ii .
There are, obviously, many factors that can influence the successful implementation of a radical new strategy-factors such as leadership, timing, resources, luck, competitor reaction, and so on. In this article, we'd like to focus on one of these factors-Information and Communication Technology (ICT)-as one of the key ingredients of successful implementation. ICT is not the only factor, nor is it sufficient. But we found that it is a key enabler to the successful implementation of radical new strategies.
How could ICT support strategic innovation?
To appreciate the role that ICT plays in strategic innovation, we must first explain what we saw as the sources of strategic innovation in the companies that we studied.
As already proposed by Derek Abell (1980) in his seminal work on the subject, all companies in an industry develop their strategies on the basis of the answers that they
give to three key questions: Who should we target as customers; What products/services and what value propositions to offer the chosen customers; and How to offer these products/services in a cost-efficient way. The answers to the Who/What/How questions form the heart of the strategy of any company-in fact, some will argue that the answers to these questions is the strategy of a company (Porter, 1996) .
Over time, as different companies claim different Who/What/How positions, the industry landscape becomes "filled" (Abell, 1980; Porter, 1996) . Thus, some companies choose to focus on specific customer segments and offer specific products/services; others choose to be global players offering one (or many) products/services; yet others choose to focus on a specific technology or distribution method and offer specific products/services to one or many customer segments. And so on. This does not mean that once they've made a choice, companies are stuck with these choices forever-any company can decide to change its customer orientation or product offering at any given time. This may be difficult but not impossible. The important point to note, however, is that over time, a given industry positioning map tends to become "filled"-that is, most possible customer segments are taken care of; most products and service offerings are being offered in one form or another; most possible distribution or manufacturing methods or technologies are being utilized. In fact, it is this filling-up of the industry space by enough competitors that eventually leads to industry "maturity".
Strategic innovation takes place when a company identifies gaps in this industry positioning map, goes after them, and these gaps grow to become big markets. By "gaps" we mean: (a) new customer segments emerging or existing customer segments that other competitors have neglected; (b) new customer needs emerging or existing customer needs not served well by other competitors; and (c) new ways of producing, delivering or distributing existing (or new) products/services to existing (or new) customer segments (Hamel and Prahalad, 1991) . These gaps tend to "emerge" for a number of reasons (such as changing consumer tastes and preferences; changing technologies; changing governmental policies; etc). The gaps can be created by external changes or in a proactive way, by the company itself.
Obviously, the first requirement to becoming a strategic innovator is to identify these gaps before everybody else does. But being first in identifying the right gaps does not guarantee success-a company still has to exploit the existence of the gap in a competitive way. This is where ICT comes into play. We found that Information and
Communication Technology can help a company exploit these opportunities in four distinct ways:
• ICT can allow a company to target new or different customers from those that traditional competitors target-that is, discover and exploit a new "Who". These are customers that the established competitors are currently ignoring because it is not very economical to serve them. ICT allows the implementation of a radical strategy that can reach these customers in a cost-effective way.
• It can allow a company to radically redefine what the value proposition of its product or service is and so offer new benefits to the consumers-that is, discover and exploit a new "What" even without changing the product.
• It can allow a company to put in place a radical new value chain that can deliver value to the customer in an innovative or economical way-that is, discover and exploit a new "How".
• It can allow a company to scale up its radical business model quickly. This protects it from competitive attacks.
We explore each of these four strategies below.
(1) Discovering "new" Customers A major source of strategic innovation is the "discovery" of a customer segment that other competitors are not currently serving (e.g. Rosenblum, Tomlinson and Scott, 2003) . The reason that these customers are not currently served by any of the existing competitors is not because the existing competitors do not know about them or do not recognize their needs. Rather, they have decided that this customer segment is either too small to chase or cannot be served profitably.
Identifying such "non-customers" (Christensen and Raynor, 2003) is the first ingredient to strategic innovation. But how could these customers be served in an economical and profitable way? After all, the main reason why the existing competitors are ignoring these customers is exactly because they cannot be served in a profitable way. How could the strategic innovators do what numerous established competitors cannot do?
According to Rosenblum, Tomlinson and Scott (2003) , the innovators that successfully target these customers are those that develop radical business models that are specifically designed to serve these unprofitable customers. In our own research, we have found that ICT could play a vital role in ensuring that these radical business models are economical and value-enhancing.
Consider, for example, the case of Edward Jones-the broker that built its success in During the 1960s and 1970s, as major brokerage firms moved towards ever-larger offices to achieve operational efficiencies and economies of scale, Edward Jones stood fast by its commitment to deliver personalised service through the single broker branch office network. But by the early 1980s, Jones' organisational processes were creaking under the weight of almost 1000 individual offices. As the number of offices and brokers grew, it was becoming increasingly difficult to provide its brokers with the necessary training or financial and trading data and communications media at a cost that would enable the organisation to remain competitive. Some within the firm believed that Jones had reached an upper limit in the number of broker offices and that further expansion would be impossible without adjustments to the Jones' model. External consultants went so far as to suggest that the firm would need to move to multiple broker offices. "Many in the industry said the single broker office couldn't survive" says current CIO Rich Mallone. Progressive's superior use of computer power for pricing and risk analysis has been recognised (Rosenblum, Tomlinson and Scott, 2003) . Less well known has been the company's development of "Claims Workbench", an ICT-enabled platform that is a key ingredient of Progressive's success in servicing the high-risk segment so efficiently. This process. This not only results in happier customers but also saves money. But perhaps most importantly, by enabling claims representatives to focus on inspecting accidentsrather than sitting behind a desk completing paperwork and responding to customer complaints about delays -Progressive also has less staff than it otherwise would. This means that the company has been able to efficiently serve those high-risk customers that nobody else wanted while simultaneously developing one of the lowest cost-structures in the industry.
(2) Offering new value propositions
New strategies invade an existing market by emphasizing different product or service attributes to those emphasized by the traditional strategies of the established competitors (Christensen, 1997) . For example, whereas traditional brokers sell their services on the basis of their research and advice to customers, online brokers sell on the back of a different value proposition, namely price and speed of execution. Similarly, whereas traditional airline companies sell their product on the basis of frequency, range of destinations and quality of service, low-cost, point-to-point operators emphasize price.
This is an important point to appreciate. Since innovators emphasize different dimensions of a product or service, their products or services inevitably become attractive to a different customer than the one that desires what the traditional competitors offer. As a result, the markets that get created around the new competitors tend to be composed of different customers and have different key success factors than the established markets.
But again, coming up with different value propositions to offer the customer is the easy part. The difficulty lies in actually offering these new value propositions in ways that make economic sense. Our research suggests that the innovating firms can use ICT to do exactly this-not only to radically redefine what the value proposition of their product is but to also deliver it in an economical way.
For example, consider the cement business where the purchasing decision is based mostly on price. The Mexican firm Cemex, the world's third largest cement company, has succeeded in redefining the basis on which customers purchase cement. Rather than focus on the cost of cement itself, Cemex is offering its product on the basis of a new value proposition-"total cost" to the customer, a notion that includes the price of cement as well as all other costs that the customer has to incur from the moment of ordering cement till it is delivered to the construction site. Specifically, Cemex is using ICT to deliver just-in-time cement. In the "traditional" way of ordering cement, customers were required to order days in advance and were then provided with a four-hour delivery 'window' during which the cement will be delivered to them. By contrast, Cemex has created business processes that enable same-day service and free unlimited order changes as standard operating procedure. to triangulate this information against order destinations and mixing plants, all the while taking traffic patterns into account, to ensure highly efficient delivery processes.
The company has introduced the kind of guarantee that competitors can only dream about: if a delivery load fails to arrive within 20 minutes of its scheduled delivery time, the buyer is refunded 20 pesos per cubic meter. That amounts to a discount of approximately 5%. With reliability exceeding 98% and with a vehicle efficiency that increased by more than 30%, Cemex can afford to offer a far more generous guarantee.
Even in the absence of these discounts, the total cost of ownership for a building contractor has been significantly reduced given that they no longer have to pay workers to stand idle at a building site waiting for cement to arrive iii . Today, Cemex is undoubtedly the best performing large company in the cement industry. It has expanded its technology-enabled model to the United States, Indonesia, the Philippines and Latin
America. Its financial performance is the envy of the industry.
Enterprise-Rent-A-Car is another strategic innovator that has redefined the value proposition of their "product". While other rental car providers have ignored or underserved the rapidly expanding insurance replacement market, Enterprise has been able to dominate this segment not merely by offering replacement cars to the clients of insurance companies, but by also providing a free, ICT-enabled car-rental processing service to insurance companies.
Over the past decade, Enterprise has been quietly developing what it calls its Automated
Rental Management System (ARMS). This is an Internet-based software application that enables insurance companies as well as Enterprise branches and auto-repair shops to manage the entire rental cycle electronically. When a customer has an accident and calls in a claim, the insurance claims agent logs on to the Enterprise ARMS extranet and automatically places a rental reservation for the customer. This is a quick and efficient alternative to what was in the past a tedious, paper-based, manual process that involved up to half a dozen phone calls to different rental office locations just to secure and process a replacement rental car. But ARMS is not limited to the rental process alone.
The system is also connected to approved auto repair shops that are required to send regular electronic updates on the status of car repairs to customers and to the insurance company. It also tracks the collection of the repaired car and return of the rental car, automatically generating an electronic invoice that is sent to the insurance company. Quite simply, the remainder of the population would be unable to afford mobile telephony given existing operator cost structures.
To develop a proposition to reach the low end of the market Smart recognized that it could not benchmark others in the mobile industry, as there were very few cases of mobile network operators who had successfully developed propositions for very low income consumers. Instead, the company looked to companies that already served this segment with other products and services, and undertook its own market research on consumer buying behavior. The company soon recognized that those Filipino population from low income segments received low weekly (and in many cases daily wages), meaning that cash flow management was a key issue. While P100 (the lowest price for a prepaid card in 2002) was not a lot of money for a consumer from the middle class, this amount represented a significant cash outlay for a family living in poverty.
Not surprisingly, when Smart looked to companies such as Proctor and Gamble and
Unilever that served this segment with fast moving consumer goods they discovered that these firms had developed low-priced micro-packs for daily necessities such as shampoo, soaps, cigarettes and food. While these 'sachets' did not represent the most economical way of purchasing goods, they met the needs of consumers in terms of low purchase price. The vast majority of these items were sold through the country's small 'Sari-Sari' stores (Sari-Sari means varied in Tagalog) that survived on high turnover low value transactions. Indeed, "tingi-tingi" or "purchasing goods in small amounts" was part of daily life, and customer surveys revealed that poor Filipinos made an average of four trips a week to their local Sari-Sari store.
Sari-sari storeowners were typically small merchants with close connections to their patrons. These merchants often provided credit when their customers were unable to afford cash purchases. It was estimated that there were over 750,000 such stores in the Philippines -at the end of 2002 Smart had fewer that 50,000 resellers of its prepaid cards. But Smart recognized that to serve Sari-Sari stores in isolated rural areas with pre-paid cards would be a costly and difficult operation in supply chain management. Warehousing, transportation and pilferage costs all contributed to the minimum value at which a pre-paid card could be sold profitably, and most industry experts saw this as an insurmountable barrier to serving geographically isolated lowincome consumers. Smart recognised that if it was to serve this segment profitably it would need to look for an alternative to the physical distribution of prepaid cards.
In May 2003, Smart introduced a revolutionary over-the-air (OTA) prepaid reloading service offering airtime in sachet-like packages. The service, dubbed Smart Load, offered prices that were broken down into smaller denominations: P30 (US$0.54), P60
(US$1.07), Pl15 (US$2.06), and P200 (US$3.58). The lower the value of the load, the shorter the expiration period of the credit (see Table 1 Smart's electronic distribution network created a new class of entrepreneurs, who found the business quite attractive. Smart estimated that, of the more than 500,000 retailers, approximately 90% were micro businesses (e.g. neighborhood stores including sari-saris, housewives, and students acting as roving agents). Smart made distribution simple for these small entrepreneurs. Retailers completed transactions using a menu embedded in a special retailer SIM card by sending specially formatted text messages that executed the sale. Many sari-sari merchants extended their existing on-credit purchasing model already used for staples and sachets to Smart Load..
The start-up costs associated with becoming a Smart retailer were minimal. A prospective merchant needed a bank account, a GSM handset, a retailer SIM card, costing PI00
(US$1.79), and an initial load balance of P300 (US$5.37). Low capital requirements enabled the company to build an extensive dealer network and recruit several hundred thousand retailers in a few months. These retailers, in turn, served a broader market area since sales could take place over the phone eliminating the need for consumers to physically travel to a retailer site. Retailers received 15% commission, with the most popular packages being P30 (US$0.54), P60 (US$1.07), and P 115 (US$2.06). According to Smart, some retailers earned up to P1000 (US$18.00) per day in re-Load sales, and many retailers indicated that they could make as much or more revenue selling OTA minutes as they could from other consumer goods sales.
To make sales and re-loads even more accessible for cash-poor customers, in December Consider also ARMS Web, Enterprise-Rent-A-Car's proprietary online system for automating the insurance replacement vehicle process. In just a decade, Enterprise has been able to dominate the insurance replacement market. This computerised system has enabled Enterprise to achieve rapid growth in an emerging niche market, without overburdening the company's physical infrastructure. New users of the system can be added at incremental cost, with only minor adjustments to the Internet-based interface required for adoption of ARMS by insurers and auto repairers.
Since its inception in 1993, ARMS has been used to process more than 10 million rentals for more than 250 insurance companies. Enterprise's insurance rental segment was able to grow almost 50 percent between 1998 and 2002 alone. The company processed more than $1 billion worth of transactions through the system last year (about one-fifth of total revenues) and ARMS is now used by 22 of the United States' 25 biggest insurance companies. Enterprise has built such a huge lead in this segment at such a fast pace, that competitors will be playing catch-up for years.
Inditex has also been able to rapidly scale up its business model by using ICT. In 1988, Inditex had a dozen or so Zara stores in Spain and just one international outlet in Cisco recognized that its future profitability and success would depend on a solution that could scale up to meet the needs of its growing business. But how could the company continue to grow without pushing its training and development systems to crisis point?
Should it attempt to outsource training services, or hire more training staff?
In 1997 Express and UPS tracking systems. Cisco believes that this system not only gives its sales force more timely information and greater control of orders, but also prevents billing and shipment problems before they arise. The self-service nature of the system has seen order-related customer calls to Cisco's sales staff decrease by more than 60%.
Cisco's main motivation for embarking on the various technology initiatives described above was to help the company deal with the dual challenges of explosive growth and rapid employee acquisition, as well as the desire to improve customer service by freeing employee time from administrative duties and face-to-face training. Cost reduction was also a goal. By the end of 2000, the company estimated that it was saving more than $86 million annually through the implementation of its various employee intranet initiatives.
Cisco continues to develop interactive Internet applications for all its functional departments, such as human resources, manufacturing and finance. Despite the impact of the current economic downturn on the organization, Cisco remains a strong case study of the role of information technology in supporting rapid growth through virtual rather than physical infrastructure.
Common Behaviours Towards Technology
In his book "Good to Great", Collins (2001) argued that technology-induced change is nothing new. What was unique about the good-to-great organizations was not that they used technology to achieve their goals but that they thought and used technology differently from mediocre firms. Specifically, technology for them was an accelerator of momentum, not a creator of it. In a similar vein, we'd like to argue that using technology to implement radical new strategies is nothing new. What was unique about the innovators who did so successfully was the behaviours that they displayed towards technology. Specifically, we'd like to argue that the behaviours of successful innovators in relation to the adoption of ICT demonstrated a number of common themes:
Successful Innovators focused on technology as a driver of value, not just as a tool for operational efficiency
Rather than using ICT primarily to shave cost from their existing business processes, successful innovators use technology to either target new or existing customer segments that could not be served efficiently using established business processes or to offer new value propositions to their existing customer base. The focus is upon value creation rather than just operational efficiency. This is true for companies as diverse as Dell
Computer, Enterprise-rent-a-car, Cemex, Cisco systems, Edward Jones and EasyJet.
This may sound obvious but it's rarely followed in most companies. For example, in a recent survey of UK-based senior executives, we found that the vast majority of spending on ICT was focused on cost reduction and improving existing business processes vi .
Fewer than 5% of responders identified ICT as an enabler of innovation and the majority viewed it as an expense rather than an investment. By contrast, the strategic innovators in our study looked at ICT as something that could not only support their strategy but also redefine their strategy. Taking a longer-term, strategic perspective, they used ICT as an enabler of top-line growth and as a tool to reach new customers or offer new benefits to existing customers in new ways. Edward Jones' investment is satellite technology was not about shaving costs from the existing business -it was about a transformational scaling-up of the Jones' business model. Similarly, Cemex's investment in ICT was about delivering a radical new value proposition for customers.
Michael Dell has often argued in favour of using ICT as a strategic rather than an operational tool. In a recent speech, he proposed that: "ICT must be viewed not in terms of cost to be carefully managed but as a powerful enabler to deliver velocity, efficiency and customer experience vii ." Our own research has demonstrated to us that to use ICT in a "strategic" way means to use it as a tool to pursue and exploit radical new "Who-WhatHow" positions in an industry that all the other competitors find unappealing. 
Successful

Successful innovators have CEOs that act as technology evangelists.
The implementation of ICT-enabled strategic innovation typically cuts across business processes and functions. Projects of this nature are notoriously difficult to implement successfully without explicit and visible senior management commitment. Perhaps not surprisingly, we identified "technology evangelists" at the top of virtually all of the strategic innovators that we studied. These business leaders were not necessarily technology experts nor did they understand fully the technical capabilities of ICT. But they fully appreciated the importance of using ICT in a strategic way and encouraged their organisations to tirelessly pursue ICT as an enabler of strategic innovation. 
Conclusion
In industry after industry, leading companies are becoming better and better at playing the performance improvement game and have little difficulty stymying competitors who play by the same. Yet, these same competitors find it extremely difficult to even conceive of a "different" way of competing; and easily lose out to any competitor that attacks them by following a different strategy. It seems that the better they execute their chosen strategy, the harder they find it to conceive of a different one, and the more easily they fall victim to an upstart who attacks them by playing by different rules.
Yet, no company can afford to ignore strategic innovation. Experience shows that dramatic shifts in company fortunes usually take place when a company succeeds in not only executing its existing strategy better than its rivals but in also designing and implementing a different strategy from its competitors. Strategic innovation has the potential to take third-rate companies and elevate them to industry leadership status; and it can take established industry leaders and destroy them in a short period of time. Even if the established players do not want to strategically innovate (for fear of destroying their existing profitable positions), somebody else will. Established players might as well preempt that from happening.
But discovering a radically different strategy is only the beginning to strategic innovation.
The important thing is not to conceive of something new and radical but to implement it successfully. Although there are many factors that can influence the successful implementation of a radical new strategy, we found that Information and Communication continue on their path of seemingly ever increasing improvement, we believe that more and more industries will be disrupted by the power of ICT-enabled strategic innovation. 
